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Introduction
1 This article is an attempt to re-examine the meaning of excuse me and (I’m) sorry usually
considered as two “common formats  for  apologizing” in  English (Fatigante  and al.,
2015: 27; see also Trosborg, 1987: 152; Meier, 1996: 216; Ogiermann, 2009: 103, 105). In
the literature, much attention has been given to (I’m) sorry, especially in recent work
adopting an interactional perspective (Mattson Bean and Johnstone, 1994; Robinson,
2004; Rhys, 2013; Page, 2014; Fatigante and al., 2015; Galatolo and al., 2015; Margutti
and al., 2016). By contrast, less research has been conducted on excuse me, and since
Borkin  and  Reinhart  (1978),  there  has  been  –  to  our  knowledge  –  no  attempt  at
(re)defining (I’m) sorry in the light of excuse me (or vice versa), at least on a synchronic
level (for a diachronic perspective, see Jucker and Taavitsainen, 2008; Taavitsainen and
Jucker, 2008). 
2 It is Borkin and Reinhart’s (1978) comparative method that the present paper tries to
renew. Borkin and Reihnart’s contrastive definitions of excuse me and (I’m) sorry relied
mostly  on  apologetic  contexts  of  use.  More  recently,  interactional  studies  have
addressed the nonapologetic function of (I’m) sorry. Mattson Bean and Johnstone (1994)  
and  Page  (2014),  for  instance, deal  with  pragmatic  uses  of  (I’m)  sorry1 in  specific
situations,  i.e.  in the workplace and in company-customer interactions through the
social  media  site  Twitter,  respectively.  Our  purpose  in  this  paper  is  to  conduct  a
comparative  analysis  of  excuse  me and (I’m)  sorry in  various  (mostly  nonapologetic)
environments, and to provide new tentative definitions for both markers, which are
not  considered  here  as  apology  markers  per  se.  We  think  these  new (hypothetical)
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definitions might account for why they sometimes appear to be mutually exclusive or
at  least  hardly  interchangeable,  and also  explain  their  sequential  order  when used
jointly. 
3 This paper also differs from previous studies on excuse me and/or (I’m sorry) in that we
adopt  a  systematic  contrastive  approach.  Within  the  framework  of  Douay  and
Roulland’s (2014) Théorie de la Relation Interlocutive (“Theory of Interlocutive Relation”,
henceforth TIR), we propose that every contextual interpretation of excuse me and (I’m)
sorry systematically derives from the fact that they fundamentally mark two different
types of ‘interlocutive relations’. As we will make clear in Section 3, this phrase does
not  refer  to  the  type  of  discursive  relation  that  emerges  as  interaction  proceeds
between two pre-existing extra-linguistic subjectivities, but rather to a relation that
has systematic roots and concerns the two theoretical profiles – sender and recipient –
which necessarily emerge within the communication process. These are introduced to
capture the idea that linguistic signs are, from the start, encoded in relation to a more
or less hypothetical conversation partner and they do not necessarily correspond to
any real-world entities, although they can be interpreted as such further down the line.
4 Our hypothesis is that both excuse me and (I’m) sorry are meant to communicate two
different types of sender/recipient relations to the receiving end of the message. We
propose that the former expression is fundamentally a form of discordance between
sender and recipient which contrasts with (I’m) sorry, which we analyse as a systematic
form of harmony between the two poles involved in the communication process (see
Section 6). 
5 The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  We  start  out  in  Section  2  by  providing  some
background to  the study of  apologies,  especially  focusing on previous  work on the
different  pragmatic  functions  of  excuse  me and  (I’m)  sorry and  their  interactional
function(s) in specific social situations. In Section 3, we lay out the main assumptions
put forward within the TIR framework which distinguish it from the field of pragmatics
in  general  and  account  for  the  reason  why  we  consider  our  study  to  be  a  new
contribution to the study of excuse me and (I’m) sorry as (so-called) ‘apology’ forms. In
Section  4,  we  provide  methodological  detail  and  point  to  the  limitations  of  the
contrastive study that is conducted in Sections 5 to 7 between excuse me and (I’m) sorry.
More particularly, we will discuss possible exclusive contexts of use of the two forms in
Section 5, which will lead us to delineate some aspects of what we assume to be their
linguistic identity. In Section 6, we proceed to examine situations in which they might
possibly be considered interchangeable, but will however argue that this is not exactly
the case and assume that the inappropriateness of either excuse me or (I’m) sorry in
these contexts is related to the type of interlocutive relation that each is supposed to
encode.  Section  7  elaborates  on  this  hypothesis  by  providing  examples  of  joint
occurrences of the two markers in which the order of the sequence <(I’m) sorry, excuse




6 Over  the  past  four  decades,  apologising  has  been  a  popular  subject  in  linguistics,
particularly in pragmatics. It has been studied extensively both synchronically (Borkin
and Reinhart, 1978; Fraser, 1981; Trosborg, 1987, 1995; García, 1989; Mattson Bean and
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Johnstone,  1994;  Aijmer,  1996;  Deutschmann,  2003;  Robinson,  2004;  Page,  2014;
Fatigante  and  al.,  2016;  Galatolo  and  al.,  2016;  Lutzky  and  Kehoe,  2016)  and
diachronically (Jucker and Taavitsainen, 2008; Taavitsainen and Jucker, 2008; Drew and
al., 2016; Kohnen, 2017; Jucker, 2018). Some of the main topics addressed in previous
work are the characteristics of apologies as a speech act (e.g. Blum-Kulka and al., 1989),
the form and function of remedial expressions (Edmonson, 1981; Fraser, 1981; Aijmer,
1996), and the role of social variables such as age, gender, social distance or power in
the use of different forms of apology (Deutschmann, 2003). There have also been a large
number of studies offering a cross-cultural approach to the subject (Blum-Kulka and
Olhstain, 1984; Blum-Kulka and al.,  1989; García,  1989; Meier,  1992; Bamgbose, 1994;
Tanaka and al., 2008; Ogiermann, 2009). Of particular interest for the present paper are
interaction-based studies which examine the discursive functions of apology forms in
apologetic  or nonapologetic contexts (Mattson Bean and Johnstone,  1994;  Robinson,
2004; Page, 2014; Fatigante and al., 2016). 
7 In English, apologising relies essentially on a small repertoire of routinised, formulaic
expressions such as (be) sorry, pardon, excuse, apologise, regret or (be) afraid (Blum-Kulka
and al.,  1989:  290;  Aijmer,  1996:  86).  Previous  research has  been conducted  on the
distinctions between the two routinised formulae under scrutiny in this  article,  i.e.
excuse me and (I’m) sorry,  either from a synchronic (Borkin and Reinhart, 1978) or a
diachronic perspective (Jucker and Taavitsainen, 2008; Taavitsainen and Jucker, 2008).
Borkin and Reinhart  (1978:  57)  define excuse  me as  “a formula to remedy a past  or
immediately forthcoming breach of etiquette or other minor offense on the part of the
speaker”. On the other hand, they consider that I’m sorry is not necessarily used as a
remedy (Borkin and Reinhart, 1978: 60) and define it as “an expression of dismay or
regret at an unpleasantness suffered by the speaker and/or the addressee” (see also
Ogiermann, 2009). Trosborg (1987: 152) also categorises I’m sorry as an expression of
regret while excuse me is said to express request for forgiveness.2 
8 Taavitsainen and Jucker (2008:  8)  observe that among the routinised expressions of
remorse and regret used to apologise in Modern English, (I’m) sorry “focuses on the
speaker’s  emotion”,  contrasting  with  excuse  me “which  asks  for  the  addressee’s
forgiveness”  (2008:  8).  They  point  out  a  diachronic  change  of  orientation  from
addressee-centred  apologies  to  speaker-centred  apologies.  In  the  Renaissance,
“apologizers asked their addressees to show generosity and forgive or overlook the
perpetrated  offense.  Present-day  speakers  […]  apologize  by  expressing  their  own
remorse without presuming or requesting any change of attitude on the part of the
addressee” (Taavitsainen and Jucker, 2008: 16; see also Jucker and Taavitsainen, 2008:
241-242). Jucker’s (2018) study of the development of apologies in the Corpus of Historical
American English (1810-2009) shows that the frequency of sorry has multiplied almost
six-fold in the most recent period, leading to the observation that “what used to be
sincere requests for exoneration has in many cases turned to token displays of regret”. 
9 Mattson Bean and Johnstone (1994) take a completely different view. Focusing on the
uses  of  sorry, excuse and  pardon (and  their  variants)  in  62  telephone  interviews
conducted  for  a  public  polling  service,  they  find  that  very  few  of  the  apologies
expressed in these interviews – most of which through the use of sorry – are responses
to particular personal offences, meant to express regret. On the basis of the observation
that “the felicity conditions for apologizing may be met only loosely” in their telephone
interviews (Mattson Bean and Johnstone, 1994: 62), they conceive of apologies as falling
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along a continuum, ranging from the most routinised apologies at one end to the most
personal and heartfelt at the other. The former, which are for the most part sorry-based
apologies,  are  called  “situational”  apologies.  They  “signal  and  remedy  minor
interactional difficulties and establish cooperative rapport” with the effect that they
ensure the smooth management of the conversation. Their function is “to restore social
equilibrium rather than to express genuine regret” (Mattson Bean and Johnstone, 1994:
59). In quite a similar vein, Page (2014) examines the way saying ‘sorry’ is meant to re-
establish  rapport  between  costumers  and  companies  interacting  through  the
microblogging site Twitter.
10 Fatigante and al. (2016) are concerned with the distinctive uses of sorry and I’m sorry.
After pointing out that these two sorry-formats “appear to perform analogous actions
in several environments, such as in the context of repair; as pre-facing apologies to
(virtual) offenses; and as post-facing apologies to offenses” (Fatigante and al., 2016: 27),
the authors argue that sorry is more preferably used “as a resource orienting toward
progressivity of and closing the apologetic encounter” or as “a ready-made resource
serving the preference for continuation and coherence in conversation” when used in
nonapologetic environments (Fatigante and al., 2016: 45; see also Rhys, 2013). On the
contrary,  they  consider  I’m  sorry a  more  suitable  formula  in  apologetic-dedicated
environments, “initiat[ing] an apology when there is subsequently an expansion of the
often quite extended apology sequence (Fatigante and al., 2016: 34).
11 We consider the findings of these interactional studies valuable for our comparative
analysis of excuse me and (I’m) sorry. We agree that these two forms occur frequently in
nonapologetic  situations  in  which  they  are  not  responses  to  particular  personal
offences, meant to express regret. We wish to use the TIR framework to discuss the idea
that  (I’m) sorry establishes  cooperative  rapport  between  interactants  in  various
situations. Moreover, we think that Fatigante and al.’s (2015) analysis of sorry in terms
of  “continuation”,  “progressivity” and “closure” can be extended to  I’m sorry when
contrasting it with excuse me, provided these terms refer to an absence of interlocutive
disruption.  Indeed,  we  will  assume  in  Section  6  that  (I’m)  sorry systematically
establishes a harmonious interlocutive relation between sender and recipient, which
contrasts with the hypothesised discordant interlocutive relation marked by excuse me.
By ‘systematically’ we mean that the kind of interlocutive relation just mentioned does
not  emerge  as  interaction  proceeds,  but  rather  is  embedded  within  the  linguistic
system. This is where we depart from interactional studies of forms like (I’m) sorry (see
Section 3 for more detail).
 
2 The Theory of Interlocutive Relation 
2.1 Background and basic principles
12 The  approach  developed  in  Douay  and  Roulland’s  Théorie  de  la  Relation  Interlocutive
(2014) stems from a critical reading of pragmatic theories which they consider to be
essentially  “monological”  in  nature  in  that  they  almost  always  recognise  only  one
communication partner – the speaker – and one side of the communication process –
emission – as founding principles of linguistic systems. The other partner – the hearer –
is often treated as a mere “alter ego”, which is only introduced further down the line as
the entity that is required to process the meaning of the message (Douay, 2005: 5).3 In
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the wake of Grice (1975) and subsequent theorising (Horn, 1984; Sperber and Wilson,
1986;  Levinson,  2000),  traditional  pragmatics  is  “viewed  as  a  form  of  intention
recognition that  involves inferentially  reconstructing the meaning that  the speaker
had  in  mind  and  wanted  to  convey,  beyond  the  literal  meaning  of  an  utterance”
(Papafragou, 2018: 167). When, and if, meaning somehow eventually comes to be shared
through communication, it is thanks to contextual “pragmatic exploitations” that build
upon local, contextually-dependent and hearer-centred factors. Even though hearer-
participation is taken into account, early approaches to pragmatics do not allow the
hearer to play an important role in the original wording nor do they often give the
speaker a central role in the construction of meaning.4
13 While criticising early approaches to pragmatics for not paying enough attention to
“the  ways  in  which  interactional  requirements  and  contingencies  impinge  upon
grammar”  (Douay,  2001:  89,  Douay  and Roulland,  2014)  do  admit  that  “duological”
views, that is to say more hearer-inclusive ways of understanding linguistic meaning,
have been gaining ground5 (cf.  Benveniste,  1966,  1974;  Culioli,  1990 for  Enunciative
Linguistics; Nølke, 2006, among others, for the Polyphony Theory; Goodwin, 1981; Ford,
1993; Ford and Wagner, 1996; Ochs, Schegloff and Thompson, 1996; Couper-Kuhlen and
Selting, 2004, etc., for Interactional Pragmatics). Yet, Douay and Roulland (2014: 20-40)
depart  from  these  “duological”  theories  in  that  they  over-emphasise  speaker-
centeredness (e.g. Enunciative Linguistics) or do not systematically use the receiving end
of communication as one of the two organising parameters from which, they claim,
every linguistic sign acquires its raison d’être. Both the TIR and interactional linguistics,
for  instance,  are opposed to  a  Gricean intention-based view of  communication.  For
interactional linguistics, this view is indeed inconsistent with a social constructionist
or interactional perspective on communication as a joint and collaborative activity”
(Haugh, 2007: 7). In the words of Arundale (2006: 196, quoting Kripendorff, 1984; see
also Arundale, 1999, 2008, 2010):
Encoding/decoding  models  explain  communication  simply  as  an  output  of  one
system that serves as an input to a separate, independent system. These monologic
accounts  treat  talk  between  people  entirely  as  a  summative  phenomenon.  In
contrast, interactional achievement models take the dyad as the minimum unit of
analysis,  and  explain  communication  as  the  conjoint  outcome  of  a  single  two-
person system.
14 Even though they agree that no aspect of meaning is ever given but should rather be
seen as worked out through “interactive negotiations” (2014: 19), Douay and Roulland
(2014),  however,  find  it  regretful  that  these  interactions,  which  underline  the  co-
constructed nature of talk (Grainger and Harris, 2003: 3; Mills, 2003: 28, 58; Couper-
Kuhlen and Selting, 2004: 1-5; Arundale, 2006: 208-209; Arundale, 2009: 2080-2085; Mills,
2011: 42; etc.), should be located at a discursive level in interactional frameworks, and
not at an anterior stage, i.e. at the systematic level of language.
15 This is why the TIR relies on the fundamental assumption that the sending and the
receiving ends of the message are both equally encoded, system-organising parameters
of language (Douay, 2005: 5). In other words, linguistic systems must be designed in
such a way that they allow for the very possibility of a meaning that is shareable from
the start.  As Douay (2001: 80) puts it,  the TIR constitutes a non-referential approach
building on Gardiner’s (1932) study of the “impact of the communicative process on the
internal  organisation  of  grammar”.  Douay  and  Roulland  (2014)  call  for  a  shift  in
perspective to include the construction of “mutual understanding” in linguistic theory.
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Insisting  that  the  primary  function  of  language  lies  in  communication  and  clearly
rejecting the widespread views that it serves to encode the speaker’s thought, the TIR is
not concerned with messaging but rather tries to show that one must always infer the
meaning of grammatical – and, as we would like to demonstrate here, lexical items –,
not  in  reference to  any  extralinguistic  objects  or  beings  –  real-world  hearers  and
speakers – but on the basis of a linguistically internalised image of the communication
process itself. 
16 We intend to show in Sections 5 to 7 that (I’m) sorry and excuse me form a contrasting
pair  (a  micro-system)  that  is  best-described  in  terms of  what  we  think  is  the core
function of language: communication. Thus, we shall argue that it is fruitful to consider
interaction as an integral part of the descriptive apparatus which is needed to tackle
the  linguistic  identity  of  (I’m)  sorry and  excuse  me,  rather  than  introduce  it  on  a
separate, pragmatic level. 
 
2.2 Replication
17 Following the TIR, we believe that the definition of linguistic meaning should include
the potentiality of being, or becoming, common to speaker and hearer, and the claim
that “shareability”6 is its most important defining feature explains why this is a central
issue within this framework. Douay and Roulland (2014: 161) deal with it through their
concept of “replication”, which is introduced in an attempt to capture the idea that
meaning can only be understood as something which comes to exist “on two sites”. The
TIR draws from general systems theory and brings together two potentially conflicting
principles: 
(i) Linguistic signs are signifiers in that they symbolise a sign/meaning association
which  must  allow for  common  interpretation and  a  certain  level  of  consensus  to
become understandable. 
(ii) Language is considered on both a general and a local level of organisation. It is
treated as  a  “system of  systems”,  which comprises  a  set  of  individual  linguistic
subsystems. 
18 These principles do not necessarily sit well together since, in accordance with Systems
Theory,  systems  (and  subsystems)  are  “self-organised”,  which  means  that  they  are
theoretically autonomous, independent and cannot rely on any external element for
their organisation (Douay and Roulland, 2014: 89-102). Therefore, if one accepts that
feelings and thoughts are of a different nature to the language system itself, linguistic
signs  should not  be  seen as  freighters  containing semantic  information or  conveying
extra-systemic  cognitive  states  or  perceptions  about  the  world,  as  this  would
undermine  the  proposed  autonomy  of  the  system.  It  follows  that  meaning  never
“travels”, and mutual understanding cannot be assumed to exist independently from
communication as it is understood within the TIR framework. Furthermore, although
there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  completely  closed  system,  reconciling  (i)  and  (ii)  both
highlights the systemic boundaries that exist between individual – i.e. independent and
self-contained – versions of the language and accounts for their need to communicate,
while questioning their ability to do so. That is why we shall posit that neither (I’m)
sorry nor excuse me contain or encode any direct reference to any offensive event or
emotion per se but rather guide linguistically towards two contrasting interpretations of
a (potentially offensive) extra-linguistic situation. Replication is a way to highlight the
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need for anticipatory regulation when it comes to interpreting linguistic signs, so that
communication can actually take place.
19 Indeed, on a local level, individual speakers of the language use their own version of
the language, so that (i) the meaning that any given speaker associates with a linguistic
item is relativistic by nature, i.e. it is only fully valid and operational within the limits of
the  speaker’s  subsystem itself,  and (ii)  it  is  therefore  speculative or  “opaque” when
considered from the outside, i.e. from within another individual subsystem. Thus, any
linguistic  sign  necessarily  enjoys  inferential,  rather  than  referential  meaning  when
considered by another speaker (Douay and Roulland, 2014: 138). Considered on a local,
rather  than a  universal  level,  each  sign/meaning  association  is  “a  private  affair”
(Douay and Roulland, 2014: 50). The above assumptions entail that all the speaker can
do  is  anticipate  what  we  wish  to  call  the  “replicability”  of  the  sign/meaning
association,  which essentially  constitutes  a  “semiotic  proposition” when considered
from  the  receiving  end  of  communication.  By  this,  we  mean  that  the  initiator  of
communication primarily defines the systematic identity of linguistic signs by assessing
the ease or the difficulty with which they may come to be accepted with the intended
meaning in a recipient subsystem. If  speakers and listeners are to understand each
other, it is necessary that the sign/meaning association be observed by both systems
simultaneously, which implies that the systemic positions are generated by the sign
instead  of  the  other  way  round.  Speakers  and  listeners  communicate  because  the
semiotic  forms  construct  them  as  such.  Hence  the  term  “replication"  (Douay  and
Roulland, 2014: 102-114). 
 
2.3 The replication process and the Interlocutive Relation 
20 By questioning the replicability of semiotic propositions, the TIR necessarily imposes a
shift in the way linguistic signs are to be analysed. They become “recipient-centred”.
This does not mean that they require the presence of an actual hearer, only that they
are fundamentally designed to regulate and guide their own interpretation in another
local  subsystem. It  is  communication itself  which is  the organising principle  of  the
system,  not  any reference to  a  pre-existing subjectivity.  This  prevents  speaker  and
hearer to be treated as extrinsic users of the language and flesh and bone entities.
Rather,  it  is  posited that language deals with the complexity of the communication
process by reducing it to a binary opposition distinguishing between an emission, or
“α-profile”, and a reception, or “β-profile”, thereby establishing two alternative voices
representing all potentially competing subsystems. Both the α and β profiles are bound
to emerge because of the drive to communicate. β is another aspect of α itself, a by-
product of its status as the initiator of communication. They are meant to capture the
purely  linguistic  roles  of  “sender”  and  “recipient”  (Douay,  2001:  83),  and  do  not
systematically  correspond  to  the  speaker/hearer  dichotomy,  which  operates  on  an
interpersonal,  extrasystemic  level7.  Douay  and  Roulland  (2014)  thereby  stress  that
linguistic forms are always, and from the start, designed with a conversation partner in
mind.  Linguistic  signs  are  both  chosen  so  as  to  establish  a  connection with  other
subsystems and regulate the reproduction of meaning from one system to the next. How
is this achieved?
21 By problematising hearer-reception, replication necessarily establishes relations of an
“interlocutive” and “dialogical” nature (see Douay, 2001) between the emission and the
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reception  profiles.  The state  of  the  α/β  relations,  which  are  communicated,  or
replicated, in the recipient subsystem, becomes crucial and is actually exploited by the
emission-profile to influence reception and semantic interpretation.8 In other words, it
is posited that, because linguistic signs serve to mark and reproduce different types of
Interlocutive  Relations  (IR),  they  impose  them  into  the hearer’s  subsystem.  This  is
compelling as it guides towards specific interpretations. The TIR distinguishes three
types of IR, related to three ways of achieving replication. Each favours certain types of
meaning to be inferred from the replicated state of the IR. 
22 Replication  can  indeed  be  achieved  through  direct  acceptance  of  the  semiotic
proposition (i) or through negotiation between the two profiles (ii)-(iii). Each mode of
replication sets up a specific “inferential frame” (see below and Section 5), and leads to
different types of semantic interpretation of the linguistic sign. 
(i) “C0-configuration”, also called “Direct Interlocutive Relation” (‘DIR’; see Douay,
2001: 83), refers to a state of the IR in which the two profiles “play an equivalent
part” (Douay and Roulland, 2008) and come to direct agreement on reference. Such
a configuration, which anticipates and imposes direct acceptance of the semiotic
proposition, is normally minimally marked and indicates that no inferential effort
is required in interpreting the meaning of the linguistic sign. It can be associated
with different English forms like the Ø-determiner, proper names, the imperative
and the Ø-ending of the simple present (Douay, 2000; Douay and Roulland, 2014).
Pre-established harmony in  the IR remains  unchallenged,  which corresponds to
immediate replication of the semiotic proposition. Interpreting the linguistic sign,
i.e. validating the semiotic proposition, is not an issue here, unlike C1 and C2 below.
(ii)  “C1-configuration”  refers  to  a  state  of  the  IR  characterised  by  a  state  of
discordance  to  be  dealt  with  between  α  and  β.  This  implies  a  polarised  IR
highlighting the role of the emission profile, and is necessarily challenging to the
reception profile. It is based on an ‘associative pattern’ (Douay, 2001: 84) whereby α
elicits  β’s  participation.  This  sets  up  an  inferential  frame  characterised  by
‘duophony’ (Douay, 2009: 24) and non-consensual, possibly polemical views on the
semiotic  proposition.  The  semantic  interpretation  of  the  linguistic  sign  is  now
clearly an issue and needs validating by the recipient as replication is explicitly
marked as unfinished and disharmonious.  This configuration of the IR has been
associated with markers like A(N), THIS and ANY, for instance (Douay, 2000; Douay
and Roulland, 2014).
(iii)  “C2-configuration”  corresponds  to  pre-eminence  of  the  reception  profile,
which results in depolarisation and a pre-imposed concordant state of the IR. This
results in a ‘dissociative pattern’ (Douay, 2001: 84), in which β-participation is no
longer required. The α-profile itself ceases to matter as well, since any potential
disagreement  is  cancelled  out.  The  two  profiles  have  become  almost
indistinguishable.  The  inferential  frame  is  now  characterised  by  ‘monophony’
(Douay, 2009: 25). This leads to unity of views as regards the semiotic proposition,
the interpretation of which has been turned into a special type of issue, a non-issue
as replication has been completed and harmony restored. Validation of the semiotic
proposition  is  now  considered  complete.  This  configuration  of  the  IR  has  been
associated  with  markers  like  THE,  THAT,  SOME and the  preterite  (Douay,  2000;
Douay and Roulland, 2014).
23 We will assume in Section 5 that excuse me is a C1-marker and (I’m) sorry a C2-marker.
 
3 Data, methodology and limitations of the study
24 The  data  used  for  our  contrastive  study  of  excuse  me and  ( I’m) sorry  within  the
framework  of  the  TIR  were  extracted  from  the  Corpus  of  Contemporary  American
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English  (COCA,  Davies,  2008-)  which  is  composed  of  over  560-million-word  texts
covering American English from the late 20th century up until  the present.  COCA is
evenly  divided  into  the  following  five  genres:  spoken,  fiction,  popular  magazines,
newspapers  and  academic  journals.  The  spoken  part  is  composed  of  transcripts  of
conversations from different TV and radio programmes. The written part is based on
short  stories,  novels,  plays,  different  magazines  from  a  wide  range  of  domains,
newspapers from across the US, and peer-reviewed journals. 
25 The examples we will provide in Sections 5 to 7 are excerpts from both the spoken and
some written parts of the corpus. Casual conversation is the prototypical speech genre
in the context of which forms like (I’m) sorry and excuse me are most often studied. For
this  reason,  the  most  part  of  our  data  illustrate  spoken English,  whether  from the
spoken part of COCA or from fictional dialogues contained in the written part of the
corpus. However, we also found it interesting to occasionally provide a few excerpts
from another non-conversational  written genre,  namely newspapers and magazines
articles, because the argumentative function of some of the uses of (I’m) sorry in this
particular  context  also  supports  and illustrates  our  hypothesis  about  its  systematic
opposition with excuse me (see examples (5) and (16) in sections 5 and 6, respectively). 
26 The present paper is not a corpus study meant to supply information as to the overall
frequency  of  excuse  me and  (I’m)  sorry,  their  distribution  across  genders,  age,  etc.
Rather,  our  interest  lies  in  the  comparison  or,  rather,  the  contrast  between  the
different types of interlocutive relations that excuse me and (I’m) sorry encode on the
level of the linguistic system, and which give rise to various pragmatic functions on a
further level,  i.e.  in discourse.).9 We investigated the first  200 occurrences that  the
corpus search yielded of both excuse me and sorry.  Out of these 400 occurrences, we
mainly extracted the syntactic structures in which the Illocutionary Force Indicating
Devices (Searle, 1969) (I’m) sorry  and excuse me are most evident and stand alone. In
other words, we excluded examples like “if you’ll excuse me” and mainly focused on
sentences in which excuse me and (I’m) sorry appeared in isolation. We considered very
few syntactically complex constructions providing explicit reference to a potentially
offensive event within the syntactic frame of the forms – e.g.  excuse me for speaking
bluntly  to  you /  I’m sorry  that  I’m speaking  bluntly  to  you.  This  gave us  a  total  of  173
occurrences for excuse me and 87 for (I’m) sorry. We also conducted a separate search of
excuse  me as  it  appeared  one  to  six  words  to  the  left  or  right  of  sorry in  order  to
investigate the possible relevance of the order of the sequence <(I’m) sorry, excuse me>
vs. <excuse me, (I’m) sorry> (see Section 7). 
27 The main reasons – apart from lack of space – for investigating the contexts in which
(I’m) sorry and excuse me stand alone are their high frequency rate (see, among others,
Deutschmann, 2003: 53) and the fact that in several excerpts, the speaker/writer uses
excuse me immediately after (I’m) sorry or vice versa. It seems to us that these excerpts
are particularly enlightening for the opposition we assume between these two forms
(see Section 7). 
28 Though (I’m) sorry and excuse me are not considered here as apology markers per se, our
presentation of the data in Sections 5-7 will rely on various types of disruptive events
as laid out in, e.g., Holmes (1995: 177), Aijmer (1996: 109), and (Deutschmann, 2003: 64).
Holmes  (1995:  178),  for  instance,  distinguishes  six  major  offence  categories:
inconvenience,  space,  talk,  time,  possessions  and  social  gaffes.  Aijmer  (1996:  109)
elaborated  on  Holmes’  taxonomy  and  proposed  an  additional  category  labelled
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‘inconvenience  or  impoliteness  to  another  person’.  Deutschmann (2003:  64)  further
refined  these  taxonomies  in  order  to  accommodate  the  range  of  apologies  he
encountered in the BNC corpus, “the aim of each category label [being] to capture the
essence of the social situations which led to the apologies that appear in [his] corpus”
(Deutschmann, 2003: 63). 
29 Our purpose is not to discuss the relevance of these taxonomies, to modify or refine
them,  but  rather  to  show  that  what  we  assume  to  be  a  systematic  interlocutive
opposition between excuse me and (I’m) sorry permeates several kinds of social situations
in which various types of ‘offences’ might be performed, and accounts for the possible
exclusion of (cf. Section 5), or at least the preference for (cf. Section 6), one of the two
expressions in  specific  situations.  In  Section 7,  we shall  also  try  to  explain the co-
occurrence of the two forms in the two sequences <(I’m) sorry, excuse me> and <excuse
me, (I’m) sorry> which might otherwise be considered a priori as counter-examples to the
assumption put forward in this paper. 
 
4 Excuse me vs. (I’m) sorry: In search of exclusive
contexts
30 The most serious difficulty when one considers the difference between excuse me and
(I’m) sorry as IFIDs lies in identifying exclusive contexts that would automatically lead a
speaker to select one of these two expressions and that one could confidently consider
as revealing of  their  linguistic  identity.  We would like to start  with Deutschmann’s
(2003:  74)  remark that excuse  me is  “typically the form […] uttered when a speaker
want[s] to catch an audience’s attention before making an announcement”. We indeed
consider that only excuse me is appropriate in (1)-(2), at least as an attention-getter, i.e.
a device which is solely used to catch someone’s attention and seek their participation
in the exchange or situation:
(1) “Excuse me, miss?” I looked up to find a short, balding man in a tweed jacket
standing at the counter.  He was holding his hand over his nose like he smelled
something terrible. “Yes?” I asked, taking a deep breath
Everything smelled fine to me. “There’s a cat in here”. 
(2015 FIC Bk: DeathByCoffee)
(2) Jasmine: We’re pregnant. 
Erik: Oh, wow. 
Jasmine: We better get engaged fast. Officially. 
Erik: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
Jasmine: You don’t seem excited. 
Erik: I really, are you, are you sure these are, these are accurate? 
Jasmine: Well, you know what, I have more. So, I will go take another one, okay? […]
Erik is left alone and as they keep to themselves he becomes desperate for another
woman’s advice. 
Erik: Excuse me, guys. Sorry to interrupt but I’m, like, freaking out. I need to talk to
somebody. 
(2014 SPOK: ABC)
31 In (1)-(2), speaker and hearer are strangers initially engaged in different occupations
until the speaker initiates conversation. In (1), the bald man wishes to draw the girl’s
attention to the statement he is about to make, i.e. “there’s a cat in here”, and Erik in
(2) addresses some strangers who are having a private conversation so as to get their
opinion on the subject of marriage, which his girlfriend has just confronted him with.
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Note that we did not find any example of (I’m) sorry as an attention-getter in COCA
among the first 300 occurrences that a corpus search of sorry yielded in the spoken part
of the corpus, which would tend to confirm that it is not the preferred form in this
situation. 
32 However, initiation of conversation is not enough to automatically cause the speaker to
prefer excuse me over (I’m) sorry, as demonstrated by the observation contained in (3):
(3) It's my experience that Brits tend to use ‘sorry’ a very great deal more often
than Americans do, and in more contexts. My English office mate uses it all the time
simply to get my attention (“Sorry, could you hand me the stapler?”). 
(https://www.lonelyplanet.com/thorntree/forums/speaking-in-tongues/topics/
michael-swan-s-golden-rules)
33 Even  though  the  speaker  in  (3)  seems  to  regard  the  use  of  sorry  to  initiate
communication as a Briticism – a somewhat marginal phenomenon in his own version
of  English –  we can wonder whether “Sorry,  could you hand me the stapler?” is  a
counter-example to our first observation for excuse me or whether the sentence should
be understood with a different implication in this context. Of course, we do not have
enough contextual evidence to decide but we shall raise two questions at this stage:
what  does  excuse  me have,  which  (I’m)  sorry does  not,  that  makes  it  a  preferred
attention-getter? And how does one define the linguistic identity of (I’m) sorry?
34 To account for the (possibly exclusive) use of excuse me in (1) and (2), we propose to
describe its ability to function as an attention-getter by assimilating it to a form which
replicates  a  polarised IR  between the  two theoretical  profiles  α  and  β  (sender  and
recipient) – i.e. a C1 marker. Note that a neat speaker-hearer opposition is inherent to
the situation of a request for attention and necessarily highlights the α/β opposition,
which explains why excuse me would be the preferred form. In (1)-(2), this type of IR can
easily be interpreted as a way to strike up a conversation between people. This can also
be taken to echo the extra-linguistic disharmony engendered by the disruption caused
by the speaker’s breaking in. The polarised IR can thus be interpreted as an admission
by the speaker that something annoying is taking place, and we see excuse me as a sign
of shared interlocutive discordance, a way for the speaker to address the hearer on
what is fundamentally a challenging mode, eliciting a sense of cooperation10 on her part
in the forthcoming exchange. 
35 We did not pinpoint specific types of offences that would automatically entail the use of
(I’m) sorry to the exclusion of excuse me. However, as will be documented in Section 6, it
seems that in situations in which the two expressions could otherwise be thought to be
interchangeable, (I’m) sorry is often associated with a sense of continuity, as in (4), or
closure and finality in the exchange, as in (5):
(4) “I thought about the reasons I like working at the restaurant. And even though
it’s only part-time, it’s a pretty long list.” She glances up, adding, “A good thing, but
I’ll try to keep it brief.” A smile flickers across Dr. Lerner’s face an instant before his
cell phone pings a muted note and his smile fades. “I’m very sorry, Reeve. Please
excuse me a second,” he says, checking the screen. […] He scowls at the phone, […]
and sets it on the corner of his desk. “I’m sorry, Reeve. Please continue.” 
(2013 FIC Bk: EdgeNormal) 
(5)  “We  may  be  able  to  do  other  projects  outside  of  maintenance,”  said  state
Department  of  Transportation  Commissioner  Russell  McMurry  in  an  exclusive
interview  with  The  Atlanta  Journal  Constitution.  “But  not  like  rebuilding  285  or
something huge like that.” Sorry, folks. A billion bucks just isn’t what it used to be.
Transportation consultants and state officials made it clear from the start of the
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debate over transportation funding last year that a billion dollars per year was the
bare minimum needed just to bring the transportation system Georgia already has
up to snuff. 
(2015 NEWS: Atlanta Journal Constitution)
36 In  both  cases,  we  hypothesise  that  the  use  of  (I’m)  sorry is  characteristic  of  a
dissociative, depolarised pattern whereby α, i.e. the sender, no longer requires β’s, i.e.
the recipient’s, participation. This is also in sharp contrast with the assumed duophonic
nature of excuse me in (1)-(2) whereby α  does clearly elicit β’s participation, and we
think example (4) provides a good illustration of the speaker’s strategy in choosing (I’m)
sorry. We analyse the first occurrence as a way for the speaker to cancel out Reeve’s
participation in the exchange and take control of the situation. Dr Lerner establishes a
certain one-sidedness to their conversational exchange as he expects her to accept the
upcoming  state  of  affairs  –  his  being  distracted  by  his  phone  and  consequently
overlooking her needs – however disruptive this might be. But Dr Lerner then realises
that Reeve will probably scowl at his unusual behaviour (it is a one-off event). So, by
adding “excuse me” – which is not used as an IFID here – he then admits that she could
resent  the  upcoming disturbance  after  all,  as  he  “allows  himself  to  be  distracted”
during their present session. Excuse me lets him impose a shared sense of competition
in the interpretation of the situation. Reeve perfectly gets the message and obviously
disapproves of his attitude (cf. “she stiffens”), which leads her to ask him if it is an
emergency.  Excuse  me gives  her  enough leeway  to  object  to  being  overlooked.  The
second occurrence of I’m sorry is meant to suggest that Dr Lerner is now putting an end
to the conflicting situation by not answering his text message. The two interlocutors
can  now  return  (cf.  “please  continue”)  to  a  previous  harmonious  state  in  their
relationship,  when  the  psychiatrist  was  actually  paying  attention  to  his  patient’s
narrative. Similarly, “sorry, folks” in (5) is a way to put an end to the ongoing debate,
which is why we consider “excuse me, folks” to be inappropriate in this context in which
the speaker is  obviously trying to have the final  say.  Note that  there is  a  sense of
finality contained in his following statement, i.e. “a million bucks just isn’t what it used
to be”. 
37 In Section 6, we will provide more evidence supporting our analysis of (I’m) sorry as a
form which replicates a depolarised IR. Recall that this ‘monophonic’ pattern (Douay,
2009: 25) downplays the role of the emission profile, precluding the recipient from any
autonomous  interpretation  of  the  semiotic  proposition.  It  thus  makes  room for  an
inferential  frame  characterised  by  unified  views  and  newly-found  consensus  and
anticipates full cooperation between sender and recipient (see Section 3). In terms of
communication, this means that (I’m) sorry is fundamentally a marker of continuity,
which is concerned with maintaining, and possibly terminating a pre-established IR.
We thus align ourselves with Mattson Bean and Johnstone (1994: 75) who see sorry-
based apologies as “a way of regaining the respondent’s cooperation and ensuring that
the interaction will continue.” 
38 In the next section, we compare the use of excuse me and (I’m) sorry in similar situations
and show that textual evidence suggests that they are not completely interchangeable
in that they elicit different interpretations.
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5 Polarisation of the IR, or lack thereof
39 In the previous section, we hypothesised that excuse me is more appropriate than (I’m)
sorry as  an  attention-getter,  because  it  is  a  form  which  essentially  dwells  on  the
speaker-hearer opposition.
40 Interestingly,  this  opposition  is  transparent  when  polemical  intent  is  added to  the
request for attention, a situation in which (I’m) sorry is infelicitous. In (6), for example,
excuse me is an attention-getter but it  is also more than that. It  is a way to initiate
conversation on a conflicting mode:
(6) I held the little creature under the tap for a moment. He was young enough to
take my impromptu bath without too much fuss and was purring as I rubbed him
down with a dish towel. “Excuse me.” The voice behind me made me twirl around
and the kitten jumped to the floor. He landed by a pair of cowboy boots turquoise
blue attached to jeans that fit like a second skin. On top of these, a woman’s face
scowled at me, the eyes wide and regal. “But who are you, and what are you doing
in my father’s house? And what are you doing with my kitten?” 
(2015 FIC Bk: KittensCanKill)
41 In (6), the speaker finds a perfect stranger, i.e. the hearer, in her father’s house. The
latter’s presence there is quite surprising, even at odds with the speaker’s expectations.
We assume that excuse me is meant to get the hearer’s attention, but also to underline
the exceptional nature of this kind of situation and indicate that the interpretation of
what is going on will be considered an issue from now on. (I’m) sorry does not work well
in  this  context,  in  which  the  speaker  signals  that  she  anticipates  differing  and
potentially competing views on the situation. Indeed, the questions “who are you and
what are you doing in my father’s house? And what are you doing with my kitten?”
highlight the sharp opposition between the speaker’s mental system or logic and the
hearer’s, as shown by the use of the adversative conjunction but in initial position. In
the speaker’s view, there is probably no accounting for the hearer’s having stolen into
her father’s house and taken care of her kitten, which is why she expresses strong
protest – just like in a breach of consensus situation illustrated in (13), (14) and (16)
below.  For  the  hearer,  however,  the  situation  is  probably  not  abnormal  since  she
decided to break into a stranger’s  house.  By replicating a polarised IR,  the speaker
draws  the  hearer’s  attention  to  the  controversial  nature  of  the  situation  and  lays
emphasis on her own viewpoint,  i.e.  a stranger should not be in her father’s house
doing what she is doing with the kitten. Excuse me is a signal to the hearer that they
need to work out a common interpretation of what is going on, and it was chosen over
(I’)m sorry so  as  to  put  the hearer  in a  position where she will  have to provide an
explanation. 
42 It is in that respect only that we consider excuse me in (6) as an expression of apology.
Note indeed that the verb excuse is a loanword from Old French escuser which was itself
borrowed from Latin excūsāre “release from a charge, excuse” (ex- “out, away” + causa
“accusation, cause”) (Barnhart, 2008: 353). The original meaning of the verb – “release
from a charge” – sheds light on the core function of excuse me as an expression of
confrontation between two entities – recall  that excuse me is  initially an imperative
form –, which is why we take it to be a duophonic marker (see Section 3), i.e. a form
which points to a disharmonious interlocutive relation between sender and recipient of
the semiotic proposition and guides towards interpretations characterised by contrast,
competition,  defiance,  disagreement,  even  insult,  non-closure,  imbalance  or
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imperfectivity (Douay and Roulland, 2014: 156). This is therefore in sharp contrast with
an altruistic view of apologising as an act that is “face-saving for the H[earer] and face-
threatening for the S[peaker]” (Olhstain, 1989: 156-157).
43 It seems that what really causes the speaker to choose excuse me over (I’m) sorry in (6) is
not just the situation of a request for attention. Polemical intent or lack thereof also
appears  to  be  a  determining  factor11 and  we  propose  that  it  should  be  taken  into
consideration when studying the two formulae in different environments. In the rest of
this paper, we will thus try to argue that exclusive contexts for excuse me and (I’)m sorry
should not rely on typical extra-linguistic situations or offenses for their definition,
such as requests for attention, hearing offenses, breech of consensus, interruption, etc.
Rather, we think that there is enough co-occurring linguistic evidence to think that
what defines a preferred context is fundamentally the wish to establish a polarised or
depolarised IR in the interpretation of the linguistic situation. 
44 Consider (7) and (8) in which excuse me and (I’m) sorry occur in different contexts. They
are not interchangeable, but why is this so? We take (7) to be charged with polemical
intent as the speaker obviously wishes to highlight a competition between her views
and Kerbey’s and therefore relies on a polarisation of the IR, of which we take excuse me
to be symptomatic. Conversely, sorry in (8) occurs in an apparently depolarised, non-
polemical context, in which excuse me would entail a different interpretation 
(7) Greig: Happy birthday, young man. 
Will: You mean I finally get a gun of my very own? 
Greig: Yep. You’re old enough now. 
Will: Awesome. 
Kerbey: Excuse me but seriously? You’re giving a gun as a birthday present to a
little kid? 
Greig: Don’t worry. I’ll teach him everything he needs to know to be safe. 
Kerbey: Oh, my gosh. Is this even legal? 
(2015 SPOK: ABC)
(8) If you’ve uploaded any music into the Music folder in OneDrive it will add those
songs, too, complete with metadata and album art that it can cull from the Internet.
Ideally, of course, you’ll already own an Xbox (sorry, Groove) Music pass, and can
stream as much as you’d like. 
(2015 MAG: PC World)
45 Kerbey’s purpose in (7) is to make Greig aware that giving a gun as a birthday present
to a kid is pure folly in his view. Kerbey wants to show his total disagreement with
Greig’s decision, which is deeply questionable to him (cf. “Oh, my gosh. Is this even
legal?”). Hence the use of excuse me, which imposes the idea that the two profiles of
communication  are  now  explicitly  engaged  in  bona  fide  dialogue  and  that  the
interpretation of what they are discussing is purportedly of a non-consensual and even
controversial nature. (I’m) sorry but seriously? would be inappropriate in this passage –
note for that matter that we did not retrieve any occurrences of the sequence in our
sample or in COCA as a whole. 
46 By contrast, it seems that excuse me would be inappropriate in (8) in which the speaker/
writer  considers  that  her  mistake –  talking about  an Xbox Music  pass  instead of  a
Groove  Music  pass  –  is  not  a  big  issue,  though  rephrasing  is  considered  a  better
solution.  We  analyse  sorry as  a  monophonic  form,  i.e.  a  way  to  associate  the  two
phrases, i.e. Xbox Music pass and Groove Music pass, with potentially discordant voices – α
and β – while subsequently refusing any real polarisation of the interlocutive relation.
Both options  are  therefore  ultimately  put  on the  same footing  and intended to  be
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interchangeable. The speaker spontaneously opts for the former while the addressee
would  probably  prefer  the  latter,  but  she  indicates  that  there  is  no  competition
between the recipient and herself on this point. 
47 We now would like to put our hypothesis to the test by comparing the use of excuse me
and (I’m)  sorry when they occur in the same situations in an attempt to show that
polarisation of the IR acts as the most important context-defining element, regardless
of what happens in the real world.12 
48 Excuse  me  and  (I’m)  sorry can  both  occur  in  the  situation  of  a  hearing  offence,  for
instance. As argued above, we think that the choice between the two formulae depends
on  the  speaker’s  choice  to  rely  on  a  polarised  or  depolarised  IR,  i.e.  to  impose  a
challenging or non-challenging IR. Let us start with sorry which is used as a simple,
neutral cue for repetition, with no polemical intent in (9):
(9) Kathie Lee Giford: Does Hoda prefer red or white wine? 
Nora-Moore: Sorry, say that again. 
Kathie Lee Giford: Does Hoda like red wine or white wine? 
(2015 SPOK: NBC)
49 Nora could obviously not hear Kathie’s question, which is  why she is  asking her to
repeat it.  This could be seen as disrupting the flow of conversation, but in fact the
request for repetition ensures that “talk flows smoothly” (Mattson Bean and Johnstone,
1994: 62) by allowing the speaker to resume her conversation with the hearer on good
terms.  The request  for repetition is  to be treated as insignificant,  i.e.  as  having no
impact on the relation between speaker and hearer, and it is thus a way to “keep the
communicative system working” (Mattson Bean and Johnstone, 1994: 62) despite its
potentially disruptive nature. Excuse me seems inappropriate as a cue for repetition and
would establish a slightly different context.
50 Indeed, when a hearing offence consists in asking someone to provide an explanation or
justification  for  some  terms  that  were  misunderstood,  as  in  (10)-(11),  or  when  one
expresses  “disbelief”  (Deutschmann,  2003:  73)  as  in  (12),  excuse  me seems  to  be  a
preferred form:
(10) “It hasn’t responded to any of the usual antivirals, either. I’ve tried oseltamivir
and zanamivir, but neither of those could stop it from escaping from its host cell. It
replicates like rabbits on fire.” “Excuse me?” said Epiphany. “Rabbits on fire? Well,
you know what I mean. Rabbits on speed. Rabbits on Viagra. Rabbits behaving like
rabbits. I’m too tired to be logical.” 
(2015 FIC Bk: Plague of the Manitou)
(11) I was confused for exactly one second, because I never made detective and so
technically I never really worked on a ‘case’. But as soon as I connected the name to
the crime, it all came back to me. You don’t see a crime scene like that without
remembering it for the rest of your life. “Darryl King,” I said. “In the train station.”
“You forgot ‘With the knife.’” “Excuse me?” “Sorry, bad joke. You know, like in that
game? Colonel Mustard, in the library, with the lead pipe?” 
(2013 FIC Bk: Let it burn)
(12) “Good at what you do?” Gigi’s furrowed expression as she sat back down on the
sofa inspired doubt in Corina. “Well, of course you are. And by the way, splendid of
you to step up after Carly left. The bull pen loves you. Who knew you were so good
with details?” “Me.” “But of course.” “That’s why I think you should just give me…”
“Corina, I hired you to spice things up.” “Excuse me?” “Girl, you used to pal around
with Paris Hilton, and I bet if I snagged your iPhone, you’d have a Kardashian or
two in your contacts.” “Hello, do you not remember my life for the past five years?”
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(2015 FIC Bk: HowCatchPrince)
51 In (10), Epiphany underlines the fact that “rabbits on fire” does not make sense in her
own system – which is not surprising since even the interlocutor acknowledges she is
not  being  logical  –  and  that  she  is  appealing  to  the  hearer,  seeking  the  latter’s
participation for clarification. The disruptive nature of the repetition request is now
made obvious to the hearer and the interpretation of the expression “rabbits on fire” is
turned  into  a  common  issue.  Excuse  me is  thus  used  to  lay  stress  on  the
misunderstanding between speaker and hearer, which is a form of disharmony between
the  two.  In  our  view,  what  excuse  me  imposes  to  both  speaker  and  hearer  is  an
imbalanced IR, since the meaning of the term has become an issue, something to be
negotiated by the conversation partners. Similarly, in (11), the policeman “who never
made detective” obviously does not get the joke. Interestingly, the “joker” does not
interpret  excuse  me as  a  pure  request  for  repetition  but  rather  as  an  invitation  to
explain  herself  and  clarify  the  reference  to  the  game  Cluedo,  which  she  does  (cf.
“Colonel Mustard, in the library…”). Again, we think that this is so because excuse me
evokes two competing linguistic systems. By contrast, when she later says “I’m sorry,
bad joke”, it is the sign that the speaker anticipates some sort of consensus as to the
quality  of  the  joke.  “Excuse  me”,  which  we  see  as  a  way  to  voice  two  potentially
conflicting views on the situation, seems unlikely at this point.
52 Conversely, (I’m) sorry is likely to be inappropriate in (12) because Corina expresses her
surprise  at  Gigi’s  opinion  that  she  hired  her  to  “spice  things  up”.  She  obviously
disagrees  on  the  semiotic  proposition,  i.e.  the  interpretation  given  to  the  hiring
process, which is marked as a controversial and conversationally disruptive issue (cf.
“Hello,  do you not remember my life for the past five years?”).  The whole point of
excuse  me here  is  to  flag  the  potentially  conflicting  situation  as  clear-cut
confrontational context for the hearer.
53 Let us now turn to the use of excuse me and (I’m) sorry in situations involving breach of
consensus  offences  (Deutschmann,  2003:  64),  e.g.  situations  in  which  interactants
disagree, contradict, reprimand or challenge one another. In (13)-(14), excuse me could
be understood as an anticipatory ‘face attack’ apology, i.e. an apology “made before or
after [a] premeditated attack on a hearer’s positive face needs” (Deutschmann, 2003:
74), in other words an attack which might counter one’s desire to be liked, appreciated,
approved, etc. (Brown and Levinson 1987). 
(13) “Take it easy, kid. It’s not so bad.” “Not so bad. Excuse me, did you just say the
words ‘not so bad’? You don’t understand, Joe, see, if a guy vomits on the sidewalk,
you don’t  say,  ‘Oh, hey,  it’s  not so bad, there’s some ham in there.’  It’s  fucking
vomit, okay? This is bad.” 
(1991 FIC MOV: The Last Boy Scout)
(14) Since there was no explaining yourself on why you are so sassed up or mad I
will have to guess, and I will guess it is probably because of the hooker thing. Or
courtesan, sorry. Yes I painted you as a hooker or courtesan and totally naked and
waiting in the bed (…) Should I say I’m sorry? I should not! I shouldn’t say I’m sorry
because, excuse me, you are a hooker. Right? I only painted the truth. 
(2012 FIC Iowa Review)
54 In (13), excuse me is not used as a request cue for repetition. The speaker has perfectly
heard and understood Joe when he said “it’s  not so bad”.  He actually repeats Joe’s
words himself (“not so bad. Excuse me, did you just say the words ‘not so bad’?”). Nor is
excuse me meant to be understood as a ‘real apology’ (cf. Deutschmann, 2003: 44-46, 69).
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We think that excuse me,  in this very expressive, polemical context (cf.  “it’s fucking
vomit”),  does  not  merely  “put  slightly  more distance between the speaker and the
addressee [than sorry does]” (Borkin and Reinhart, 1978: 62) but rather emphasises the
disagreement and disharmony between the two interlocutors caused by their differing
views on the relevant matter, Joe’s opinion – “vomiting is “not so bad” – being most
controversial to the speaker who thinks otherwise (cf. “you don’t understand”, “this is
bad”). 
55 (14) is an excerpt from a letter sent by a male painter to his female model, Victorine, in
response to a furious letter she had sent him previously.  Excerpts from Victorine’s
letter are provided in (15): 
(15) You paint like a porcupine. 
I  had occasion to go see this painting Olympia for myself.  And I was astounded.
Indignant. What were you thinking? 
Next time you go to the Salon, go with your pants off. Then you’ll know how I feel. 
(2012 FIC Iowa Review)
56 At first, the speaker in (14) anticipates that Victorine will feel offended because of his
reference  to  “the  hooker  thing”,  but  by  rephrasing,  i.e.  “or  courtesan,  sorry”,  he
pretends to have made a concession to the hearer in his choice of words, so as to avoid
hurting  her  feelings.  At  the  end  of  his  turn-taking,  he  no  longer  discusses  the
potentially offensive nature of the term hooker itself, but the right for him to paint the
woman as such a person (cf. “Should I say I’m sorry? I should not!”). Interestingly, he
then goes on to use excuse me to show that he stands his ground in the face of a most
upset Victorine who obviously objects to seeing herself  pictured as a courtesan (cf.
(15)).  That  is  when  he  chooses  to  use  the  word  hooker again.  The  speaker  now
emphasises  his  own initial  judgment  as  being the  right  one,  thus  undermining  the
hearer’s.  We analyse  the  move  from sorry to  excuse  me as  one  of  depolarisation  to
repolarisation of the IR. By now refusing to “say sorry” and using excuse me, he comes
across as extremely provocative, to the point of being insulting. We also hypothesise
that the use of excuse me in (13)-(14) leads the hearer to infer that some response is
expected by the speaker (cf. “okay?” in (13), and “right?” in (14)), and gives rise to a
sense of imperfectivity in the exchange (Douay and Roulland, 2014: 156). Excuse me is
understood as a cue that the conversation/argument is not over, which gives enough
leeway for a possible subsequent retort. 
57 By contrast, we assume that when a speaker expresses disagreement with a hearer, she
may use sorry to impose some kind of agreement between speaker and hearer. This
enables her to give her side of the story without polemical intent, thus sounding less
controversial, as in (16) in which sorry functions as a disarmer (Edmondson, 1981: 282),
i.e.  an  anticipatory  strategy  preparing  the  hearer  for  a  potentially  unwelcome
statement:
(16)  Oscar  prep  takes  at  least  three  hours.  “Of  course  they  look  flawless.  Who
wouldn’t?” Brooke says. “Can you imagine how amazing you would look (with that
much help)?” Every nominee has a speech scripted, just in case. We love to think
we’re seeing spontaneous tears and authentic astonishment up there on stage. But,
sorry it’s not true. “Everyone, whether they admit it or not, has a speech prepared
in the event of winning an Oscar. We practice them in the shower, in the car, in the
middle  of  the  night,  when we think no one’s  listening,”  says  industry  publicist
Bumble Ward. 
(2015 NEWS: USA Today)
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58 This example is distinct from (13)-(14) in that it is an excerpt from a newspaper and, as
such, is representative of a written genre. (13)-(14) are also extracted from written data
but  are  more  representative  of  a  spoken  genre  because  they  are  excerpted  from
fictional  dialogues.  However,  sorry in  (16)  has  an  argumentative  function  which is
worth comparing to that of excuse me in (13)-(14), which are other examples of breech
of consensus. Sender and recipient roles in newspaper articles are quite evidently taken
up by journalist and potential readers, respectively. The former deals with more or less
debatable issues and sender and recipient(s) are not necessarily expected to think alike.
There is a pre-existing situation of argumentative disruption to be dealt with in the
real world. It is not unreasonable to think that the journalist in (16) could potentially
decide to say either (I’m) sorry or excuse me. She contradicts (cf. “but it’s not true”) the
general view that is held about “Oscar prep” and we propose that she uses sorry instead
of  excuse  me to  avoid  sounding  too  polarising  and  alienate  her  readership  as  sorry
indicates  that  the  journalist  tries  to  deconstruct  the  contextually  pre-established
duologic IR and return to monophony by voicing what is now presented as a more or
less unified view on the issues under discussion. It is thus a way for her to mitigate the
challenging effect of the opposition, to keep a low profile, and “to establish cooperative
rapport” (Mattson Bean and Johnstone, 1994: 59) with the reader. 
59 Let us now consider one last type of situation, which involves what Deutschmann calls
a ‘minor accident’ (2003: 64). One can infringe on somebody else’s personal space by
bumping into them, walking too close to them, taking their seat, etc. (Goffman, 1971).
Note that the accident may have just occurred or be about to occur. While Swan (2005:
535) associates excuse me with forthcoming offenses and (I’m) sorry with pre-validated
offenses in British English,  American usage appears to be slightly different.  Indeed,
Borkin and Reinhart (1978:  61) seem to agree that the latter can be analysed as an
expression of regret used “in remedial interchanges when a speaker’s main concern is
about a violation of another person’s right or damage to another person’s feelings”
while the latter constitutes “a formula to remedy a past or immediately forthcoming
breach of etiquette” for American speakers. This suggests that one could preferentially
–  in  British  but  not  necessarily  in  American  English  –  associate  excuse  me with
anticipation of the offense, as in (17). By contrast, (I’m) sorry is preferentially used in
both varieties after the offence has taken place, as in (18):
(17) “Excuse me, ma’am.” Bell stepped aside, realizing that she was blocking the
narrow sidewalk and thus impeding access to the store. Moving past her, a heavy
man in a green plaid wool coat pulled at the ragged bill of his Peterbilt cap.
“Ma’am,” he repeated. 
(2015 FIC Bk: LastRaggedBreath) 
(18)  “Sorry!”  A  lady bumped Aidan from behind and was  quick  to  apologize.  A
moment later a man elbowed him in the ribs. No apology there. 
(2014 FIC Bk: No sunshine when she’s gone)
60 The obvious function of excuse me in (17) is to let the hearer know that the speaker is
aware of the disturbance he might create by possibly bumping into her or by asking her
to move aside. Simultaneously, the hearer is meant to understand that she is in the
speaker’s  way.  We think that if  excuse me is  felicitous in anticipatory offences,  it  is
because  the  speaker  imposes  hearer-involvement  in  interpreting  the  situation.  By
replicating a polarised IR, the speaker leads the hearer to infer that they are actually
competing for space. 
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61 By contrast, the speaker in (18) says sorry retrospectively, that is after bumping into the
hearer. We hypothesise that sorry imposes complete previous agreement on the ‘body
accident’ (Deutschmann, 2003: 67) for which the speaker alone is responsible, which
explains why it is the preferred form in post-bumping situations. The speaker admits to
the offense and the hearer “does not have any say” in its interpretation. As a result,
things can now smoothly go back to normal. In other words, by relying on sorry the
speaker tries to distance herself and the hearer from the offence.13 
62 Note that it is the hypothesised polarisation and depolarisation of the IR by excuse me
and (I’m) sorry,  respectively, which cause the body accident situation involved to be
interpreted as almost exclusive contexts in the case of (17) and (18). The fact that the
formulae are uttered before or after the event is not the most determining factor, as
demonstrated  by  American  usage14.  Thus  we  do  not  think  that  (19)  constitutes  a
counter-example to our analysis. However tempting it is to associate (I’m) sorry with the
idea that the offence has been prevalidated in the speaker’s mind and excuse me with
new or  forthcoming offences,  the  latter can actually occur  after  someone has  been
bumped into:
(19) She saw his chest expand with a deep breath just as she was bumped roughly
from behind. “Excuse me, Miss Benbridge.” Startled, her gaze turned to identify the
offending individual and found a wigged man wearing puce satin. She muttered a
quick dismissal  of  his  concern,  managed a brief  smile,  and swiftly returned her
attention to the masked man. 
(2017 FIC Bk: A passion for him) 
63 Our claim enables us to propose that excuse me was chosen over (I’m) sorry because the
offending  man  needed  enough  leeway  to  voice  “his  concern”  and  to  leave  Miss
Benbridge  a  chance  to  react  to  the  offence,  which  she  was  obviously  not  really
interested in doing initially.  She nonetheless had to “voice a quick dismissal  of  his
concern”, which (I’m) sorry would not necessarily have led her to do. We think that she
analyses excuse me as a clue that the speaker expects her to react in some way. 
 
6 Joint occurrences
64 As  mentioned  in  Section  4,  we  found  it  enlightening  to  examine  examples  of  co-
occurrence of excuse me and I’m sorry. A search throughout COCA returned 45 relevant
occurrences.  How do  these  fit  in  with  our  analysis?  One  may  assume  that  the  co-
occurrence of excuse me and (I’m) sorry is meant to intensify the apologetic force of the
utterance  –  provided,  of  course,  that  the  forms  are  used  as  ‘real  apologies’  (cf.
Deutschmann, 2003: 44-46, 69). This is a possible interpretation of (20): 
(20) She got on the bus wearing the same clothes she’d had on for three days. She
looked for a window seat. She found one in the middle, next to another woman who
was cradling a young boy. As she climbed over the boy and woman to get to her
seat, Nichelle held her arms down to her sides, and said, “Sorry, excuse me. I’m
sorry.” She was apologizing for her body’s odor. 
(2016 FIC Callaloo)
65 But we also came across other examples of co-occurrence of excuse me and (I’m) sorry in
which the linguistic environment supports the idea that a speaker uses excuse me to
dwell  on  interpersonal  conflict  or  highlight  the  need  for  cooperation  in
communication,  whereas  (I’m)  sorry downplays  conflict  or  takes  cooperation  for
granted in interpersonal exchanges. We think that the order of the sequence <excuse
Excuse me vs. (I’m) sorry as two contrasting markers of interlocutive relations
Corela, 17-2 | 2019
19
me,  (I’m)  sorry>  or  <(I’m)  sorry,  excuse  me>  is  of  paramount  importance  in  such
circumstances. 
66 First, consider (21) which illustrates the sequence <excuse me, (I’m) sorry>:
(21) Neil Minkoff: You know, when I watched it, what I – the message I got was,
wow. Somebody’s really worried about the enthusiasm gap and because nobody on
my side of the aisle is saying, hey, guys, wake up. Pay attention. 
Jimi Izrael: Clint Eastwood. 
Arsalan Iftikhar: Yeah. 
Jimi Izrael: Excuse me. I’m sorry. Go ahead. 
Neil Minkoff: No one’s saying pay attention. People, you know, on one side of the
aisle can’t wait to go out and vote. 
(2012 SPOK: NPR)
67 Interruptions  –  which  are  part  of  Deutschmann’s  (2003)  ‘Lack  of  consideration’  or
Holmes (1990: 177) and Aijmer (1996: 109) ‘talk’ offences categories – are particularly
interesting, since they provide a context in which communication itself lies at the core
of the linguistic exchange, a configuration that we find especially revealing within the
TIR framework. In our analysis, Jimi in (21) uses excuse me to show that he is aware of
the disharmony caused by his interrupting Arsalan, who was beginning to speak, after
he himself had interrupted Neil Minkoff. Saying “I’m sorry” afterwards suggests that
Jimi  wants  Neil  to  resume  his  previous  line  of  conversation  (cf.  “go  ahead”).  The
interruption opposing speaker and hearer is over at this stage, and it is supposed to
have  been  harmoniously  dealt  with.  The  use  of  sorry after  excuse  me clearly  has  a
conclusive effect and confirms that it is “a resource orienting toward progressivity of
and closing the apologetic encounter”, in other words “a ready-made resource serving
the preference for continuation and coherence in conversation” (Fatigante and al, 2016:
45).  The  reverse  sequence  <I’m  sorry.  Excuse  me.  Go  ahead>  would  probably  sound
awkward. On the contrary, by using (I’m) sorry,  the speaker authorises the hearer to
continue on,  unchallenged,  thanks to a  depolarised IR.  It  indicates that  sender and
recipient can now move on to another topic.
68 In (22)-(24), on the other hand, excuse me and sorry appear in reverse sequence. Again,
we think that the order <sorry, excuse me> was not chosen randomly:
(22) Morgan: You’re in good nick for 86, don’t you? 
E. Edwards: Sorry, excuse me. 
Morgan: You’re in good nick. You are in good shape. 
E. Edwards: Well, yes. I am very fortunate. 
(2013 SPOK: CNN)
(23) Diane Sawyer: You’ve mentioned health care, and I just want to summarize
your position, which is really dangerous, because I’m going to get it wrong. But it’s
basically to eliminate Medicare, replace it with... 
Mr Bradley: No, no. 
Sawyer: Medicaid, sorry. Medicaid, excuse me. Definitely different. 
(1999 SPOK: ABC_GMA)
(24)  Joseph paused before  answering,  but  when he finally  opened his  mouth to
speak, his father’s mouth opened simultaneously - forced to do so by a large belch
that filled the kitchen with the stench of beer. Peter looked down at his feet just in
time to avoid the look of disgust that enveloped Joseph’s face. “Sorry. Um, excuse
me, I mean.” 
(2008 FIC Bk: Passin’)
69 In (22), Morgan uses an expression which E. Edwards is obviously not familiar with,
which leads Morgan to clarify it in the following line. We assume that E. Edwards chose
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to say “excuse me” just after saying “sorry” because he realised that saying “sorry”
would  lead  the  hearer  to  merely  repeat  the  same  expression  without  actually
explaining. Note for that matter that E. Edwards was only able to respond to Morgan’s
initial question “you’re in good nick for 86, don’t you?” once Morgan had rephrased the
expression “in good nick” into “in good shape”. In (23), it seems that the speaker first
says “sorry” because she mistook Medicaid for Medicare until she realises that the use
of sorry is not the most appropriate strategy for dealing with the ‘name offence’ and
that her mistake really is  an issue for the hearer (cf.  “no,  no”),  which leads to the
additional  comment  “definitely  different”.  Finally,  (24)  is  an illustration of  a  social
gaffe, i.e.  belching. Peter breaks “a social etiquette rule relating to socially frowned
upon behaviour” (Holmes, 1990: 180; cf. also Aijmer, 1996: 109; Deutschmann, 2003: 64).
He first says sorry to apologise for what he initially thinks he and the hearer will not
consider a controversial situation, but the look of disgust on the hearer’s face shows
otherwise. He is thus led to rephrase (“excuse me, I mean”) his apology after realising
that  his  loud  belching  is  definitely  controversial  for  Joseph,  hence  the  need  to
acknowledge  that  he  is  to  be  involved in  the  interpretation of  the  situation.  Peter
probably feels that excuse me is more appropriate at this stage because it allows for the
common articulation of two implicit and contrasting viewpoints in the conversation,
one (Peter’s) that holds the belief that “a loud belch is a very minor offence and the
hearer will not question my view that apologising for it is a matter of routine” and one
(Joseph’s) that supposedly thinks that “a loud belch should be severely frowned upon as
an offence that the interlocutor must remedy.”
 
Conclusion
70 Although we generally agree with Jucker and Taavitsainen’s (2008: 229) observation
that it is “difficult to define a functional common core to all realizations of what are
commonly called “apologies’”, we hope to have shown that it is not completely relevant
to the study of excuse me and (I’m) sorry. We believe that there is a certain circularity in
trying to define the linguistic identity of both expressions by treating them as markers
of apology, and find it surprising that they quite commonly appear in nonapologetic
situations.  This  logically  leads  to  questioning  the  relevance  of  what  is  called  an
“apology”  in  the  first  place,  a  course  of  action  followed  by  other  scholars
(Deutschmann, 2003, among others). 
71 We have been following a different path here. Our hypothesis, which is based on Douay
and Roulland’s (2014) TIR framework, gives a central role to the recipient/hearer, not
on a discursive level, but on the systematic level of language organisation. This non-
referential framework has enabled us to propose – on the basis of contextual evidence –
that excuse me and (I’m) sorry do not encode, or contain in themselves, any reference to
a detrimental or offensive event, the seriousness of which could be assessed by flesh
and blood beings, the speaker and hearer. Rather, we have been claiming that they
indicate  that  what  is  at  stake  is  the  potentially  conflicting  interpretation  of  an
extralinguistic event that may fall under different categories, e.g. breach of consensus
offences,  hearing  offences,  social  gaffes,  requests,  competition  for  space,  etc..  The
nature of the situation itself and its supposed seriousness, or lack thereof, does not
appear  sufficient  to  fully  define  exclusive  contexts  for  excuse  me and  (I’m)  sorry.
However,  on  the  basis  of  data  extracted  from COCA,  we  claim that  linguistic  clues
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suggest that the two expressions influence hearer-interpretation of the situation in a
different manner. We therefore think that preferred contexts of use should be defined
in terms of polarisation or depolarisation of the IR.
72 In particular,  we have tried to show that excuse  me replicates a  discordant sender/
recipient relation, which leads the hearer to infer that, by highlighting an opposition
between α and β, the speaker wishes to establish a connection with her. For example,
this may be taken to mean that the speaker wishes to request hearer-participation in
the construction of a sincere apology, elicit cooperation or, on the contrary, exacerbate
what separates them in a polemical context, even sound insulting. By contrast, (I’m)
sorry imposes a concordant sender/recipient relation, which leads the hearer to infer
that, for some reason, the speaker wishes to downplay any opposition between α and β.
This may be inferred to mean that she no longer needs hearer-participation in the
construction of a sincere apology, that cooperation is taken for granted, and that the
situation or conversation can resume its normal course after a disruption. Whatever is
polemical in other situations is, more or less strategically and sincerely, glossed over.
73 At this stage, further work will have to be done in order to see whether an analysis of
the type we propose here is appropriate for other IFIDs like pardon (me), for instance. 
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NOTES
1. Mattson Bean and Johnstone (1994) examine two other ‘apology’ forms, i.e. excuse me/’scuse me
and I beg your pardon/pardon (me), but (I’m) sorry remains their main object of study.
2. Note, however, that Trosborg (1987: 151) recognises that her category ‘request for forgiveness’
is oversimplified. 
3. This is perfectly summarised by Papafragou (2018: 167) when she highlights the traditional
theoretical  opposition  between  “linguistically  encoded  (semantic)  and  contextually  derived
(pragmatic) aspects of communicated meaning”.
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4. The same kind of criticism was developed in Thomas’s (1995) textbook Meaning in Interaction
which tries to make up for these shortcomings by according a central place to the roles of both
speaker and hearer in the construction of meaning”. Thomas (1995: 22) claims that “meaning is
not something which is inherent in the words alone, nor is it produced by the speaker alone, nor
by the hearer alone”. Rather, ‘making meaning’ is seen as “a dynamic process”.
5. For  example,  Douay  (2001:  89)  salutes  Lambrecht’s  effort  to  introduce  “a  syntax  for
conversation” (1994)  and Schlegloff’s  call  for  a  grammar “retheorized for  interaction” (1996:
52-133). 
6. The word is ours and we use it to clarify Douay and Roulland’s (2014) concept of replication.
7. This distinction is crucial for a shift of focus from an interpersonal relation to an interlocutive
relation (Douay, 2001: 83).
8. We shall see that this type of anticipation can serve to manipulate hearers by forcing upon
them a purported common interpretation. See example (7) in Section 5, for instance. 
9. This, in turn, could explain the much higher frequency rate of sorry-based apologies reported
in several previous studies. In Holmes’s (1990 : 172) and Aijmer’s (1996 : 86) studies, respectively,
79.3% and 83.7% of the apologies studied were variants of sorry. In Deutschmann (2003 : 51), the
discrepancy between excuse- and sorry-based apologies is also quite obvious : out of a total of 3072
“explicit” apologies, 59.2% contained the word sorry while only 10.4% contained excuse. 
10. In other contexts, the speaker may choose to highlight the antagonistic relationships existing
between α and β but what remains is the call for hearer participation (cf. example (5)). 
11. Although we describe excuse me and (I’m) sorry in terms of a challenging vs non-challenging IR
rather than in terms of degrees of politeness, this analysis seems to be consistent with Aijmer’s
(2018) study on attention-getters in adolescents’ speech. Following Leech (2014), Aijmer (2018:
191)  notes  that  excuse  me is  often  used  with  ironic  undertones  and  that  “the  speaker  says
something which is  interpreted as ‘polite’  on the surface but is  ‘more deeply’  interpreted as
impolite”. 
12. For lack of space, we had to limit ourselves to just a few specific situations but the contrast
between excuse me and (I’m) sorry is obvious in many others, as we intend to show in further
research. 
13. Interestingly, sorry about that is five times as frequent as sorry about this in Deutschmann’s
corpus. According to the author, “that seems to function as a device to dissociate the offender
from the offence” (2003: 56).
14. Thus,  the fact  that  American speakers tend to use excuse  me in  post-bumping situations,
contrary to other speakers of English, may be revealing of different politeness conventions. In
particular, because it replicates a polarised IR, a C1-marker of this type could, in particular, be
interpreted by the  hearer  as  a  sign that  the  speaker  is  still  trying to  connect  with her  and
establish good interpersonal rapport following the disruptive event. It might well be that British
politeness, by relying on a C2-marker in the same situation, normally hinges on an attempt to
communicate the idea that offenders take full responsibility and admit to the aggravating nature
of the event.
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ABSTRACTS
Building  on  the  Theory  of  Interlocutive  Relation,  we  hypothesise  that  the  semantic  and
pragmatic meaning of excuse me and (I’m) sorry, which are not fundamentally forms of apology,
derives from the fact that they establish two different kinds of Interlocutive Relations, guiding
towards possible interpretations of  a disruptive event.  We analyse excuse me as  a ‘duophonic
marker’, i.e. a form imposing disharmony between an emission and a reception profile. This can
be taken as a way to request hearer cooperation for the sake of politeness, in an attempt to
remedy a breach of etiquette or, rather to the contrary, as a way to exacerbate the conflicting
nature of a situation in non-apologetic contexts. On the other hand, we assume that (I’m) sorry is
a ‘monophonic form’ meant to restore interlocutive harmony between the two profiles. Hearer
cooperation is then taken for granted and downplays conflict in apologetic and non-apologetic
situations.
Dans le cadre de la Théorie de la Relation Interlocutive,  nous proposons que l’interprétation
sémantique  et  pragmatique  de  excuse  me et  (I’m)  sorry,  qui  ne  sont  pas,  par  essence,  des
marqueurs d’excuse, s’effectue en fonction de deux types de relation interlocutive différents qui
conduisent  à  plusieurs  interprétations  possibles  d’un  événement  perturbateur.  Excuse  me est
considéré  comme  marqueur  duophonique,  c’est-à-dire  comme  une  forme  qui  impose  un
désaccord  entre  un  pôle  émetteur  et  un  pôle  récepteur.  On  pourra  y  voir  une  demande  de
coopération de l’allocutaire par politesse, pour tenter de réparer un manquement à l’étiquette,
ou,  bien au  contraire,  un moyen d’accentuer  la  nature  conflictuelle  d’une  situation dans  un
contexte autre qu’un contexte d’excuse. A l’inverse, nous faisons l’hypothèse que (I’m) sorry est
une forme monophonique qui s’emploie pour rétablir l’harmonie interlocutive entre les deux
pôles. Avec ce marqueur, la coopération de l’allocutaire est considérée comme acquise, ce qui a
pour effet de minimiser le conflit dans des situations d’excuse ou autres. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: duophonie, (dés)accord, relation interlocutive, monophonie
Keywords: duophony, (dis)harmony, interlocutive relation, monophony
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